Beighley v. State Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 40319 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
6-24-2013
Beighley v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 40319
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Beighley v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 40319" (2013). Not Reported. 1087.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1087
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
WENDY BEIGHLEY, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
NO. 40319 
TETON COUNTY NO. CV 2011-370 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF TETON 
HONORABLE DARREN B. SIMPSON 
District Judge 
SARA 8. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. #5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. #6247 
SPENCER J. HAHN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #8576 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, ID 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
PETITIONER-APPELLANT 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEY FOR 
RESPONDENT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1 
Nature Of The Case ................................................................................... 1 
Statement Of The Facts And 
Course Of Proceedings .............................................................................. 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL .................................................................... 5 
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 6 
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed 
Ms. Beighley's Claim That Her Attorney Was Ineffective For 
Failing To Move To Withdraw Her Guilty Plea Upon The State's 
Breach Of The Plea Agreement ................................................................. 6 
A. Introduction ..................................................................................... 6 
B. Standards Of Review ...................................................................... 6 
1. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel ........................................ 6 
2. Summary Dismissal .............................................................. 7 
C. The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed 
Ms. Beighley's Claim That Her Attorney Was Ineffective 
For Failing To Move To Withdraw Her Guilty Plea Upon 
The State's Breach Of The Plea Agreement ................................... 9 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 12 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .............................................................................. 13 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148 (2008) ................................................................ 8 
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900 (2007) ..................................................... 8, 9 
Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76 (2002) .......................................................... 7 
Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588 (Ct. App. 1993) .................................................... 10 
McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567 (2010) ................................................................. 8 
Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274 (1998) ................................................................ 7 
Owen v. State, 130 Idaho 715 (1997) ................................................................... 9 
Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671 (2010) ................................................................ 8 
State v. Daubs, 140 Idaho 299 (Ct. App. 2004) ............................................ 10, 11 
State v. Harness, 600 N.W.2d 294 (Iowa 1999) ................................................. 10 
State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 610 (Ct. App. 2010) .............................................. 10 
State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437 (2008) .............................................................. 8 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ................................................ 6, 7 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) ............................................................... 7 
Statutes 
I.C. § 19-2601 ..................................................................................................... 10 
I.C. § 19-4903 ................................................................................................... 7, 8 
I.C. § 19-4906 ....................................................................................................... 8 
ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Wendy Beighley appeals from the district court's judgment summarily dismissing 
her petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, she asserts that the district court erred 
when it summarily dismissed her claim that she received ineffective assistance of 
counsel when her attorney failed to move to withdraw her guilty plea upon the State's 
breach of the plea agreement. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Wendy Beighley was convicted, by guilty plea, of one count of lewd conduct, and 
received a unified sentence of twenty years, with seven years fixed. On direct appeal, 
she unsuccessfully challenged the length of her sentence. (R., p.2.) Following her 
appeal, Ms. Beighley filed a timely, verified petition for post-conviction relief in which 
she raised a number of claims, only one of which is relevant on appeal: that she 
received ineffective assistance of counsel when her attorney "refus[ed] to withdraw [her] 
guilty plea." (R., pp.1-2.) In elaborating on this claim, she explained that "counsel failed 
to withdraw guilty plea" despite "a clear breach in of [sic] the plea agreement." (R., p.3.) 
The district court appointed counsel with respect to the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim at issue on appeal, while providing notice of its intent to dismiss her other 
claims. 1 (R., pp.13-14.) Post-conviction counsel then filed a response to the district 
court's notice of intent to dismiss in which he gratuitously asserted, inter alia, that he 
1 Those claims concerned her sentence and were properly dismissed as they were 
addressed in her direct appeal. 
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had contacted trial counsel who "told the undersigned that he never received a request 
from petitioner to withdraw her plea, either prior to sentencing or after sentencing. He 
indicated he did not receive a request from her either in writing, in person, or over the 
phone." (R., p.23.) Ms. Beighley then filed a handwritten affidavit in which she 
elaborated on her claim, writing, 
I agreed to a guilty plea, for one count with the second to be dropped. 
was also told by my attorney Faren Eddins that the prosecuting attorney 
Chris Lundberg was okay with a sentencing of probation and outpatient 
treatment. My PSI recommended a "period of incarceration," during 
sentencing Mr. Lundberg stated that the Judge follow the recommendation 
of the PSI for sentencing. Spencer Hahn my appellate Public Defender 
was the one who found the discrepancy and suggested that [I] ask for a 
plea withdrawal and to do this before my appeal was decided. I then tried 
to contact Mr. Eddins by phone several times and was unable to get 
through to him. I also asked my parents to try and contact Mr. Eddins and 
they were also unsuccessful in contacting him, before the deadline. Since 
the time he was appointed to me I had difficulty contacting Mr. Eddins, this 
is a violation of Code of Professional Conduct IRPC 1 .4. 
(R., pp.28-29.) 
The PSI writer's recommendation was as follows: 
I do recognize the benefits of "community-based placement and outpatient 
treatment," including continued counseling sessions as well as sex 
offender specific treatment. However, I suggest additional sanctions are 
also warranted in Ms. Beighley's case. The defendant chose to victimize 
both of her children, at the request of a stranger. It is impossible to gauge 
the long-term effects of that abuse on [her children], but I believe 
Ms. Beighley should be held accountable for her actions and the potential 
impact to her children. Therefore, I respectfully recommend the Court 
consider a period of incarceration in the defendant's case. 
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.11-12.) 
The State filed a Response to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The State described what it believed to be the likely claim raised 
by Ms. Beighley as being "that there was a breach of the plea agreement in this matter," 
2 
which it described as "inaccurate, unsupported by the record, unsupported by any 
admissible evidence known to the State, and if resolved in the Petitioner's favor would 
not entitle the Petitioner to the requested relief." (R., p.39.) 
The State described one term of the plea agreement, a copy of which was 
attached to its response,2 as being a promise that "[t]he State does not object to 
withheld judgment," and went on to note that there were: 
two (2) uncontestable facts in the record of these proceedings that 
demonstrate that this term of the plea agreement was not violated. The 
first of those is that the State never objected to the request for a withheld 
judgment ... The second uncontestable fact in the record of these 
proceedings is that, while the State was barred from objecting to a 
withheld judgment, the State was not obligated to recommend a withheld 
judgment. 
(R., pp.40-41.) The State concluded this portion of its motion by noting that because 
"the State made no sentencing recommendation and never objected to entry of a 
withheld judgment, there is simply no basis for the Petitioner to allege that there was a 
violation of the third term of the plea agreement." (R., p.42.) 
The State also explained that, 
the relief requested in this matter in her original Petition ... a reduction in 
sentence to a unified term of five (5) years ... and a subsequent release 
onto probation, is a remedy inconsistent with the Petitioner's allegation of 
ineffective assistance of counsel and/or breach of a plea agreement . . . 
[because] Petitioner's length of sentence has been determined on 
I " appea .... 
(R., p.43.) The State then explained, 
If the District Court were to somehow find merit in the Petitioner's 
allegations, the appropriate remedy in that case would be to withdraw the 
2 The copy of the Plea Agreement attached to the State's response was omitted from 
the post-conviction appellate record. A copy is contained in the appellate record from 
Ms. Beighley's direct appeal (37799 R., pp.23-25), which has been judicially-noticed by 
this Court. 
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plea agreement and set the matter for trial on the original Criminal 
Information containing both Count I and Count II. The State would also be 
entitled to pursue additional criminal charges related to the facts of the 
case and would be allowed to object to a withheld judgment at sentencing. 
(R., p.43 n.1.) 
At a hearing on the State's motion for summary judgment, the district court 
dismissed the claim regarding her attorney's failure to seek to withdraw her guilty plea, 
finding, "[i]t was a legal sentence" and that "[s]he has not indicated any grounds which 
would justify the withdrawal of that plea or any manifest injustice or any other facts upon 
which the Court might be inclined to withdraw the plea," and concluded that "there is no 
genuine issue of material fact at issue." (Tr., p.13, L.9 - p.14, L.2.) The district court 
then issued a Judgment dismissing the petition. (R., p.54.) 
Ms. Beighley filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., p.56.) 
4 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Ms. Beighley's claim that her 
attorney was ineffective for failing to move to withdraw her guilty plea upon the State's 
breach of the plea agreement? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Ms. Beighley's Claim That Her 
Attorney Was Ineffective For Failing To Move To Withdraw Her Guilty Plea Upon The 
State's Breach Of The Plea Agreement 
A. Introduction 
The district court erred when it summarily dismissed Ms. Beighley's claim that 
her attorney was ineffective for failing to move to withdraw her guilty plea upon the 
State's breach of the plea agreement because there was a genuine issue of fact as to 
the claim. 
B. Standards Of Review 
1. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant 
in a criminal case the right to counsel, which includes the effective assistance of 
counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984). Further, the 
Constitution guarantees a fair trial through its Due Process Clauses, but it defines the 
basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth 
Amendment, including the Counsel Clause. Id. at 685. 
"When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's 
assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. The Sixth Amendment "relies ... on 
the legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's 
presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the 
Amendment envisions." Id. The "proper measure of attorney performance remains 
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simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id. In light of the Sixth 
Amendment's reliance upon the legal profession's standards, the Idaho Supreme Court 
has stated that the starting point for evaluating criminal defense counsel's conduct is the 
American Bar Association's Standards For Criminal Justice, The Defense Function. 
Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274,279 (1998). 
In addition to proving deficient performance, in most instances a defendant also 
must prove that he was prejudiced. "The defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added). 
"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome." Id. However, a "defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct 
more likely than not altered the outcome in the case." Id. at 693. As was recognized by 
Justice O'Conner, the author of the Strickland opinion, in her concurring opinion in 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), 
If a state court were to reject a prisoner's claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel on the grounds that the prisoner had not established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the result of his criminal proceeding 
would have been different, that decision would be "diametrically different," 
"opposite in character or nature," and "mutually opposed" to our clearly 
established precedent because we held in Strickland that the prisoner 
need only demonstrate a "reasonable probability that ... the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." 
Id. at 405-06 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696). 
2. Summary Dismissal 
An application for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 
138 Idaho 76, 79-80 (2002). An application for post-conviction relief must be verified 
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with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant. I.C. § 19-4903. 
The application must include affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its 
allegations, or must state why such supporting evidence is not included. Id. 
The court may summarily dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief when the 
court is satisfied the applicant is not entitled to relief and no purpose would be served by 
further proceedings. I.C. § 19-4906(b). In considering summary dismissal in a case 
where evidentiary facts are not disputed, summary dismissal may be appropriate, 
despite the possibility of conflicting inferences, because the court alone will be 
responsible for resolving the conflict between the inferences. See State v. Yakovac, 
145 Idaho 437, 444 (2008) (addressing case where State did not file a response to 
petition). However, where the facts are disputed, a court is required to accept the 
petitioner's unrebutted factual allegations as true, but it need not accept the petitioner's 
conclusions. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007). 
Summary disposition on the pleadings and record is not proper if a material issue 
of fact exists. I.C. § 19-4906. When genuine issues of material fact exist that, if 
resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to relief, summary 
disposition is improper and an evidentiary hearing must be held. Baldwin v. State, 145 
Idaho 148, 153 (2008). At the summary dismissal stage, the petitioner need only 
present prima facie evidence of both prongs of Strickland. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 
567, 571 (2010). 
When reviewing a district court's order of summary dismissal in a post-conviction 
relief proceeding, the reviewing court applies the same standard as that applied by the 
district court. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675 (2010). Therefore, on review of a 
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dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court 
determines whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions 
and admissions together with any affidavits on file and liberally construes the facts and 
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903 
(citation omitted). The lower court's legal conclusions are reviewed de nova. Owen v. 
State, 130 Idaho 715, 716 (1997). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Ms. Beighley's Claim That 
Her Attorney Was Ineffective For Failing To Move To Withdraw Her Guilty Plea 
Upon The State's Breach Of The Plea Agreement 
The evidence before the district court at the time that it summarily dismissed 
Ms. Beighley's ineffective assistance of counsel claim clearly established a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether her attorney was ineffective for failing to move to 
withdraw her guilty plea upon the State's breach of the plea agreement. 
Ms. Beighley established that she had entered into a plea agreement with the 
State, one of the terms of which was that the State would not object to a withheld 
judgment. (R., pp.1-3; 37799 R., p.24 ("The State does not object to withheld 
judgment").) At sentencing, defense counsel asked that the district court grant 
Ms. Beighley a withheld judgment. (37799 Sent.Tr., p.29, Ls.4-7.) While the State did 
not expressly object to a withheld judgment and advocate imposition of a prison 
sentence, it did so tacitly when it said, 
Finally, you know, I, I guess I would just refer to the - to all the 
recommendations in the presentence investigation [report], including the 
recommendation for what to do, to do in this case; and just ask the Court 
to be sure to review all, all of the information contained in this, in this 
packet, weigh it appropriately, and, and certainly weigh all those 
recommendations for, for appropriate sentencing in this matter. 
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(37799 Sent.Tr., p.33, Ls.4-12 (emphasis added).) 
The PSl's recommendation was as follows: 
I do recognize the benefits of "community-based placement and outpatient 
treatment," including continued counseling sessions as well as sex 
offender specific treatment. However, I suggest additional sanctions are 
also warranted in Ms. Beighley's case. The defendant chose to victimize 
both of her children, at the request of a stranger. It is impossible to gauge 
the long-term effects of that abuse on [her children], but I believe 
Ms. Beighley should be held accountable for her actions and the potential 
impact to her children. Therefore, / respectfully recommend the Court 
consider a period of incarceration in the defendant's case. 
(PSI, pp.11-12.) 
This tacit objection to a withheld judgment constituted a breach because, while a 
judgment remains withheld, a prison sentence cannot be executed. I.C. § 19-2601. 
Despite this clear breach of the plea agreement, defense counsel did not object, did not 
advise Ms. Beighley of her ability to move to withdraw her guilty plea, and did not file a 
motion to withdraw her guilty plea. (R., pp.1-3, 28-29.) Ms. Beighley was prejudiced 
because, upon the issuance of the remittitur in her direct appeal, the district court lost 
jurisdiction to consider a motion to withdraw her guilty plea. See State v. Peterson, 148 
Idaho 610, 614 (Ct. App. 2010). 
When a defendant enters a guilty plea in reliance upon a promise 
by the prosecution, a breach of that promise will invalidate the plea. 
Because a guilty plea waives certain constitutional rights, "a defendant is 
constitutionally entitled to relief when the state breaches a promise made 
to him in return for a plea of guilty." 
Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 595 (Ct. App. 1993) ( citations omitted). "[A]n essential 
duty" of defense counsel is to object upon a prosecutor's breach of a plea agreement. 
Failure to do so constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Harness, 600 
N.W.2d 294, 301 (Iowa 1999). 
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A prosecutor may not pay mere "lip service" to his or her obligations under a plea 
agreement. See State v. Daubs, 140 Idaho 299, 300 (Ct. App. 2004) ("If the 
prosecution has breached its promise given in a plea agreement, whether that breach 
was intentional or inadvertent, it cannot be said that the defendant's plea was knowing 
and voluntary, for the defendant has been led to plead guilty on a false premise. In 
such an event, the defendant will be entitled to relief.") (citations omitted). 
In Daubs, the prosecutor originally assigned to the case reached a plea 
agreement with Daubs under the terms of which the State would "recommend that 
Daubs receive no more than a rider." At the sentencing hearing, a new prosecutor 
acknowledged the State's promise to ask for no more than a rider before it "directed the 
court's attention to the presentence investigation (PSI) report, which recommended 
prison .... " Id. The Court of Appeals described the prosecutor's statements as 
"fundamentally at odds with the terms of the plea agreement" because it included 
"highlight[ing] the contrary recommendation of the PSI investigator" for a prison 
sentence, and concluded that it "amount[ed] to an abrogation of the plea agreement, 
and a tacit adoption of a recommendation altogether different from the one for which the 
state and defendant had bargained," and breached the plea agreement. Id. 
In this case, Ms. Beighley established that the State breached the term of the 
plea agreement that it would not object to a withheld judgment when it, like the 
prosecutor in Daubs, tacitly adopted the PSl's recommendation that a prison sentence 
be executed. Ms. Beighley also established that her attorney failed to object to the 
breach and failed to counsel her that she could move to withdraw her plea, let alone file 
a motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Ms. Beighley's claim of ineffective assistance of 
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counsel presented a genuine issue of material fact for which she was entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing, and the district court erred when it summarily dismissed it. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Ms. Beighley respectfully requests that this 
Court vacate the judgment of dismissal as to her claim, and remand this matter for an 
evidentiary hearing. 
DATED this 24th day of June, 2013. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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